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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LULU BLACK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
V. PERSHING NELSON, RALPH L. 
SMITH and GLADYS SMITH, d/b/a 
GLADYS' BEAUTY SALON, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for personal injuries sus-
tained in a fall down a flight of stairs allegedly caused by 
defendants' negligent maintenance of the rear entrance 
to a beauty salon. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court 
granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict based 
on the finding that the actions of plaintiff constituted 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
Case No. 
13470 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the trial court's ruling 
that acts of the plaintiff constituted contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law and an order remanding the case 
for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 25, 1971, plaintiff, Lulu Black, had an ap-
pointment at 2:00 o'clock p.m. at Gladys' Beauty Salon 
on University Avenue in Provo, Utah. The plaintiff had 
been a regular patron of Gladys' for approximately one 
and one-half years. Plaintiff and her husband had in-
tended to travel to Idaho the following day and had one 
of their two automobiles being serviced for the purpose 
of making that trip (Tr. p. 223). Mr. Eugene E. Black, 
plaintiff's husband, had instructed Mrs. Black to pick him 
up at the Courthouse at approximately 3:00 p.m. that 
afternoon so that he could use her car (Tr. p. 223). This 
necessitated Mrs. Black making arrangements with her 
hair dresser, Mrs. Suzan Hanks, to leave the beauty salon 
for a few minutes while her hair was up in curlers and go 
pick her husband up so that he could use the vehicle while 
Mrs. Black finished her hair appointment (Tr. p. 246). 
At approximately 3:00 o'clock p.m. Mrs. Black left Gladys' 
Beauty Salon to pick her husband up at the Courthouse 
and made arrangements to return a few minutes later 
to have Mrs. Hanks finish drying her hair and combing 
it out. Mrs. Black went to the Courthouse with her hair 
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in curlers and was unable to find her husband. There-
after, she returned to Gladys' Beauty Salon to finish 
having her hair dried and combed out. Plaintiff testified 
that upon her return there was no parking at the front 
of Gladys' Beauty Salon and, consequently, she was forced 
to park on 1st East and 2nd North (Tr. p. 247). Mrs. 
Black testified that because there was no parking place, 
her hair was in curlers, and that the hair dryer was located 
in the rear of Gladys' Beauty Salon, when she returned to 
the beauty salon she chose to enter the establishment 
through the rear entrance in the back of the building (Tr. 
p. 247). She opened the rear door into a small landing 
area. From this landing area she could walk through an 
interior doorway into the rear of Gladys' Beauty Salon. 
Mrs. Black testified, and the testimony of other witnesses 
indicates, that both patrons and employees occasionally 
used the rear door for the purpose of entering and leaving 
the beauty salon (Tr. pp. 58, 156, 216, 248, 321, 385 and 
386). Mrs. Black testified that on one prior occasion she 
had left the beauty salon through the rear entrance (Tr. 
pp. 247-248). The weather outside was clear, it was a 
bright sunshiny June afternoon. As she opened the outer 
doorway into the landing area, light from the outside 
lighted the room and Mrs. Black stepped inside (Tr. p. 
249). The door dosed behind her and she found herself 
in the middle of the landing area in almost complete dark-
ness (Tr. p. 249). Mrs. Black testified that she did not 
realize that the electric overhead light inside the landing 
area was out until the door closed behind her (Tr. p. 
251). She testified that she did not see nor did she have 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
any independent knowledge that the unguarded stairway 
at the west end of the landing was there (Tr. p. 250). 
When plaintiff opened the outside door and walked 
into the landing area she was able to observe the door to 
the inside of Gladys* Beauty Salon on the south wall of 
the landing area, but was not looking at the stairway on 
the west wall, nor did she have any reason to believe that 
there was a stairway at the west end of the landing area. 
When the outside door closed it was dark. The immediate 
area was unlighted because the electric overhead light 
was off or burned out. Consequently, she could see neither 
the outside door through which she had just walked nor 
the stairway, and there is conflicting evidence as to 
whether she was able to see light from under the doorway 
of the beauty salon so that she could walk towards that 
direction. After the outside door closed, Mrs. Black at-
tempted to walk towards the inside door of the Gladys' 
Beauty Salon. She knew generally where the interior 
door was because she had seen the interior door when the 
other one was open (Tr. p. 249). She knew there was 
only three or four steps, at the most, from her position 
in the middle of the landing to the inside door of the 
beauty salon (Tr. p. 250). She did not anticipate nor 
did she know of the stairway. She was cautious and 
reasonably prudent trying to avoid bumping into some 
other obstacle or into some other person. Plaintiff took 
two or three short steps and fell down the stairs into the 
basement. As a result of this fall, plaintiff was severely 
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injured, which injuries are of no consequence in so far 
as this appeal is concerned. 
This dispute concerns the nature of the plaintiff's fall. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, defendants were granted 
a directed verdict, claiming the plaintiff was contributor-
ily negligent as a matter of law. Plaintiff maintains that 
she acted in a careful and reasonably prudent manner at 
at all times. The plaintiff entered the business establish-
ment from the rear entrance, which she had observed 
other people do. Her hair was in curlers, she was con-
scious of her appearance, it was a more convenient access 
to the rear of the establishment where the dryers were, 
and the plaintiff had no reason to believe that the en-
trance and landing area contained an unguarded stairwell. 
Plaintiff further contends that her status is that of 
a business invitee, since patrons continually used this 
rear entranceway. Defendants countered by asserting 
that this entrance was seldom used by patrons, that Lulu 
Black had the status of a licensee, to whom they owed 
no duty to warn of the dangerous or defective condition 
in the landing area. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I. 
A D I R E C T E D V E R D I C T B A S E D ON 
C O N T R I B U T O R Y N E G L I G E N C E AS 
A M A T T E R O F L A W I S A D R A S T I C 
S T E P T H A T I S J U S T I F I E D O N L Y 
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W H E N T H E P L A I N T I F F ' S N E G L I -
G E N C E I S SO C L E A R L Y E S T A B -
L I S H E D T H A T R E A S O N A B L E 
M I N D S CAN R E A C H NO O T H E R 
CONCLUSION. T H E F A C T S I N T H E 
I N S T A N T CASE C L E A R L Y D E M O N -
S T R A T E T H A T R E A S O N A B L E M E N 
COULD D I F F E R A N D T H A T T H E 
C O N T R I B U T O R Y N E G L I G E N C E , I F 
ANY, O F MRS. BLACK, I S A Q U E S -
T I O N F O R T H E T R I E R O F FACT. 
As recently as August 16, 1973, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
"Upon a motion for a directed verdict, the trial 
court is obliged to view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the party against whom it 
is directed. The court will sustain the grant-
ing of a such a motion only if the evidence were 
such that reasonable men could not arrive at a 
different conclusion." Anderson v. Gribble, 
513 P.2d 432 (Utah (1973). 
As a general rule, courts are very reluctant to impose 
their judgment as to what reasonable men may differ 
over. This is rightly so since the existence of negligence 
on the part of the plaintiff must be clearly and overwhelm-
ingly conclusive for it to be a question of law. The de-
fendants must cleariy establish that reasonable minds 
could not differ. See State for the Benefit of Workman's 
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Compensation Fund v. Columbia Hall Association, 75 
N. D. 275, 27 N. W. 2d 664 (1947), and Keech v. Clements, 
303 Mich. 69, 5 N. W. 2d 570 (1942). 
In this case, however, the trial court has ruled that 
the plaintiffs actions constituted contributory negligence 
as a matter of law. 
Prior to the trial, the Fourth District Court, the Hon-
orable Maurice Harding, Judge was asked to rule on de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment. This motion 
was made upon the grounds and for the reasons that the 
undisputed facts allegedly showed that plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law (R. p. 47). De-
fendants' motion was based precisely on the same fact 
situation that was indicated by the evidence presented 
at trial. Judge Harding, presumably a reasonable man, 
ruled: 
"Unless the question of the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence is free from doubt, the Court 
cannot pass on it as a question of law. If the 
Court is in doubt whether reasonable men 
might arrive at different conclusions, then this 
very doubt determines the question to be one 
of fact for the jury and not one of law for the 
Court. 
A reading of the Utah cases cited by counsel, 
Sections 308 to 318 in 62 Am.Jur.2d, and the 
annotations in 22 A.L.R.3d 281, 24 A.L.R.3d 
388, 25 A.L.R.3d 466, and 28 A.L.R.3d 605, 
leaves one very much in doubt as to what the 
mythical reasonable man would hold. 
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The Court, therefore, denies the motion for 
summary judgment." (R. p. 58) 
The plaintiff contends that a reading of the A. L. R. 
3d citations, the Am. Jur. 2d citations and the Utah cases 
cited in plaintiff's memorandums, would confirm the 
correctness of Judge Harding's deoision and urges that 
the same rationale foe applied by this Court. 
The trial court's precise rationale in granting defen-
dants' motion for a directed verdict, on the same basis as 
the earlier motion for summary judgment was denied, is 
stated thus: 
". . . But the Court, in searching and thinking 
on the matter, and the law, feels that I must 
dispose of the ma/tter at this time, and it will 
be my ruling on the motion that because of the 
fact based on plaintiff's own testimony, that as 
she opened the door and light went into the 
corridor into which she was going sufficient to 
enable her to see all that was there, but the fact 
that she did not look directly ahead of her, but 
only to the left or to the South, as she put it, 
looking only to and identifying the door into 
Gladys' shop, and the further fact that with-
out having made full observations that would 
have disclosed to her what was in front of her 
and the direction into which she was going, and 
after the door closed behind her she proceeded 
in such a dark area constituted contributory 
negligence as a matter of law/' (Emphasis 
added) (Tr., p. 406) 
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It should be noted that the Court does not appear 
to base its contributory negligence ruling on the step-in-
the-dark rule. Plaintiff contends that the step-m-tihe-dark 
rule is customarily invoked when one steps into an area 
which is completely unknown. It is usually invoked when 
one is helplessly groping into the unknown, but in this 
instance the plaintiff had opened the door and had seen 
where she intended to walk prior to having the darkness 
envelop her. She was not looking to the west where the 
unguarded stairway was, and she did not anticipate that 
a stairwell existed. 
It appears that the Court's finding of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law is based on the fact that 
Lulu Black failed to look and to observe that the area 
directly west of the outside doorway, which was a place 
that the plaintiff did not intend to go. Instead of walking 
in a westerly direction in the room, plaintiff testified on 
cross examination that she intended to walk to the South 
or the Southwest to get to the interior door of the beauty 
salon (Tr. p. 302, lines 5-7). Plaintiff thus argues that 
if one reads the precise words the court used in explaining 
why it felt compelled to grant the motion for directed 
verdict that the court is not invoking the step-in-the-dark 
rule but merely stating that the plaintiff should have seen 
what was in a direction that she did not intend to go. 
It is further argued that light travels in a straight 
line, that when Mrs. Black opened the door the light 
illuminated the landing area and that this light may not 
have illuminated the stairwell, which was below the sur-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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face of the floor, enabling her to see the steps in any 
event, and that this again should have been a question 
for the trier of fact. It should be remembered that there 
was no overhead illumination in the room. 
Another fact that precludes invoking the step-in-the-
dark rule is that the landing area was not enveloped in 
complete darkness. After all, darkness is a relative term 
(See Point III) and the record clearly shows that there 
was a light shining under the door that was the inside en-
trance into Gladys' Beauty Salon. (Quoting from the 
Transcript, page 249, lines 13 through 23) : 
Question (Mr. Howard) "What did you do 
when you found yourself in the dark ?" 
Answer (Mrs. Lulu Black) "Well, by this 
time I was quite positive that I was just as 
close to one door as I was to the other, because 
when I opened the door I could see the passage-
way to the Beauty Shop door, and I thought I 
was going in that direction in the dark. 
And rather than turn around I just didn't 
think to turn around and go back to the door 
that had closed on me. I didn't know where it 
was as much as I knew where the lighted door 
was. And I was going in that direction." 
One of the defendants, Mr. Ralph L. Smith, supports 
Mrs. Black's testimony as follows: (Quoting from the 
Transcript, page 352, lines 23 to 28.) 
Question (Mr. Ivie) "Now, what about the 
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doorway, itself. When the door is shut and the 
light is on in your salon, does the light from 
your Salon show under the door?" 
Answer (Mr. Ralph L. Smith) "There is a 
small opening underneath that door I have 
never measured it.. I t could be half an inch, 
but the light shows underneath the door." 
Again on page 365, lines 3 to 8, Mr. Smith states: 
Question (Mr. H . Wayne Wadsworth) "And 
is it a fact that three of us went over there and 
closed those doors to see if the light went under-
neath the door?" 
Answer (Mr. Ralph L. Smith) "That's cor-
rect." 
Question (Mr. Wadsworth) "And did it show 
underneath the door?" 
Answer (Mr. Smith) "I t absolutely did." 
Thus plaintiff argues that from the record itself there 
is revealed that: (1) The plaintiff saw where she in-
tended to go, in a South or Southwesterly direction, not 
in a Westerly direction from the open doorway, and (2) 
There was testimony at the trial which indicated that 
there was light under the door which revealed where 
plaintiff wanted to go. Plaintiff argues that the transcript 
itself precludes the application of the step-in-the-dark rule 
and that the Court itself didn't even invoke this rule in 
its decision. 
If the record and the court's rationale precludes the 
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applicability of the step-in-the-dark rule, then plaintiff 
submits that the question becomes whether the failure 
of Mrs. Black to look in a direction in which she did not 
intend to walk is contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. Plaintiff argues that it is clearly not, but rather it 
is a question upon which reasonable minds can differ. It 
is certainly not conclusive proof of negligence as the trial 
court held. 
The basic thrust of plaintiff's argument is that a rul-
ing of contributory negligence as a matter of law is simply 
a specialized example of certain circumstances in which 
reasonable minds cannot differ on the standard of care 
to be exercised by the plaintiff. Plaintiff submits that 
reasonable minds in the instant case can easily differ 
as to the existence of any negligence on her part and that, 
therefore, the issue of contributory negligence should 
have been submitted to the jury as a fact question. 
An example of the stringent standards that courts 
exact in granting non-suits or directed verdicts by holding 
contributory negligence present as a matter of law is the 
case of Waters v. Harris, 110 S. E. 2d 283 (N. C. 1959). 
In this case a 45 year old groceryman fell on a puddle of 
grease in a dark warehouse. The plaintiff had desired to 
buy a refrigerated meat display case and had contacted 
a dealer who took him to a warehouse where he kept 
second-hand equipment. The dealer opened the door, but 
did not turn on any lights and it was dark inside the 
warehouse. As the plaintiff was examining a case near 
the open door, the dealer said, "Come on, follow me and 
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let me show you some more equipment". The groceryman 
followed about a step or two behind the dealer, but slipped 
and fell on a puddle of grease about 30 feet from the door. 
In reversing the trial court's judgment of a non-suit, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court said: 
"A non-suit on the grounds of contributory 
negligence will be granted only when the plain-
tiff's evidence establishes the facts necessary 
to show contributory negligence so clearly that 
no other conclusion may be reasonably drawn 
therefrom." {Supra, 287) 
The stringent standard referred to above even in the 
so called step-in-the-dark cases is discussed at 28 A. L, R. 
3d, page 616: 
"The step-in-thedark rule is not an absolute 
rule of law. It is merely a specialized example 
of certain circumstances in which reasonable 
minds cannot differ on the standard of care to 
be exercised by a plaintiff. Even when the facts 
of the case fit squarely within the terms of the 
rule, other facts may render it inapplicable, as 
where the plaintiff could reasonably expect no 
danger in a given situation, an ordinarily pru-
dent person might be lulled into a false sense 
of security, or plaintiff exercised caution com-
mensurate with the circumstances. Moreover 
the rule is inapplicable where any of its ele-
ments is absent, as where the plaintiff was not 
unfamiliar with the place where he walked . . . " 
((Emphasis added) 
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Plaintiff submits that the usual cliche that each case 
must be decided on the particular facts is even more com-
pelling when the question of the presence of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law is posed. Each case must 
turn on its own facts. This is true even when one gropes 
his way in the dark. 
The Court in Palmer v. Boston Penny Savings Bank, 
301 Mass. 540, 17 N. E. 2d 899, 28 A. L. R. 3d 605 at 
692, upheld the jury's verdict in finding that a parking 
garage patron was not contributorily negligent in enter-
ing the garage through a darkened door at 2:00 a.m. to 
get his car. The patron left his car in the garage at about 
6:00 o'clock p.m. and had walked out by the large center 
door which served as the entryway for the vehicles. The 
patron saw, a few feet West of the vehicle entrance, an-
other door which was level with the garage. Upon re-
turning the next day at about 2:00 o'clock a.m., the patron 
found the vehicle door closed and was unable to open it 
or to attract the attention of garage employees stationed 
within. He then saw a door a few feet East of the vehicle 
entrance and believing that it was the West door he 
opened it and stepped into complete darkness inside and 
fell down an iron stairway leading to the boiler room. The 
court stated in overruling exceptions to the judgment 
based on the jury's verdict in the patron's favor that 
ordinarily one who gropes his way along in the darkness 
of a strange place and falls down a stairway or into an 
elevator well is lacking in due care, but the issue must 
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be determined on the particular facts in each case and 
was thus a jury question. 
Plaintiff's remaining analysis will concentrate on 
enumerating the facts which in the instant case would 
cause reasonable men to differ as to whether the plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent. Plaintiff contends that if 
reasonable men can differ as to the presence or absence 
of negligence or in other words if it is not conclusive but 
questionable, then there exists a question of fact for the 
jury. The following points will discuss the reasons plain-
tiff believes that reasonable men can differ and that, 
therefore, the directed verdict was improperly granted 
and that contributory negligence was a question for the 
jury. 
P O I N T I I 
THE REAR E N T R A N C E TO 
GLADYS' BEAUTY SALON HAD 
BEEN USED BY GLADYS'PATRONS 
AS A MEANS OF ENTERING AND 
LEAVING THE PREMISES. PLAIN-
TIFF, LULU BLACK, HAD ON ONE 
PRIOR OCCASION LEFT THE BEAU-
TY SALON BY MEANS OF THE 
REAR DOOR AND, THEREFORE, 
LULU BLACK C O U L D REASON-
ABLY ASSUME THAT THIS EN-
TRANCE WAS IN A REASONABLY 
SAFE CONDITION FOR HER TO USE 
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ON T H E D A T E OF T H E A C C I D E N T . 
Plaintiff submits that the record establishes that the 
rear door to Gladys' Beauty Salon was used by many 
patrons because of its convenience and that this use was 
acquiesced in and in some cases even permitted by the 
owners of Gladys' Beauty Salon, Mr. and Mrs. Smith. 
This is fully substantiated by the evidence introduced 
at trial. Mrs. Suzan Hanks testified (Tr., p. 53): 
Question (Mr. Howard) "All right. During 
the time you were there and prior to June 25, 
1971, did you have occasion to see patrons 
come and go to Gladys' establishment through 
the back door?" 
Answer (Mrs. Suzan Hanks) "Yes." 
On page 58 of the Transcript Mrs. Hanks testified 
to the names of a few of the patrons of Gladys' Beauty 
Salon who were accustomed to using the back door. On 
page 156 of the Transcript, Mrs. Gail Timms, another 
beauty operator, testified that the back door was used 
by patrons. On page 216 Mrs. Gloria Howard testified 
that she frequently used the back door. On page 258 
Mrs. Lulu Black testified that she had left the beauty 
salon via the rear door on one prior occasion. On page 321 
Mrs. Irene Wooton testified that she had occasionally 
left the establishment via the back door if it was conven-
ient. On page 385 and 386 of the record Mrs. Gladys 
Smith testified that she did allow certain patrons by 
specific permisson to use the back door. 
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Mrs. Lulu Black had noted, while a patron at Gladys', 
that other patrons did come and go through the back 
entrance. Plaintiff argues that from these facts that there 
was an implied invitation extended to her to use this 
entrance as other patrons were continually doing. There 
was no sign on the outside door of the building prohibit-
ing patrons from using or entering through this rear door. 
Plaintiff submits that this factual pattern gives Lulu 
Black the status of a business invitee. 
The testimony clearly shows that the rear door to 
Gladys' Beauty Salon was used by both patrons and em-
ployees alike, that it was not always kept locked, and 
that the patrons were not denied access nor were they 
requested not to use this back door. The defendants, by 
their actions, acquiesced in their patrons using this rear 
door to gain access to the beauty salon. 
The defendants have maintained that Mrs. Black is 
a licensee. However, this is contrary to the recent cases 
which hold that the status or classification of a person 
who is upon the property of another is not to be deter-
mined by the occupants' responsibility or the degree of 
care which goes to that person. Rather, the occupant in 
the management of his property should act as a reason-
able man in view of the probability or foreseeability of 
injury to others. A person's status as a trespasser, licen-
see or invitee may, of course, in light of the facts giving 
rise to such status, have some bearing on the question 
of liability, but it is only a factor and certainly not con-
clusive. See Rowland v. Christian, 60 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. 
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Reporter 97, 443 P. 2d 561, 32 A. L. R. 3d 496 (1968); 
Pickard v. Honolulu, 452 P. 2d 445 (Hawaii, 1969); 
Levine v. Katz, 132 App. D. C. 173, 407 Fed. 2d 303, An-
notation: Premises Liability — Claimant Status, 32 
A. L. R. 3d 508; Mile High Fence Company v. Radovich, 
489 P. 2d 308 (Colorado, 1971). 
Plaintiff refers the court to its memorandum regard-
ing the duty of due care which was submitted to the trial 
court for a synopsis of modern case law on the subject. 
The overwhelming weight of modern authority compels 
a finding that Mrs. Black was owed a duty of ordinary 
care as established by a reasonable man standard in view 
of the probability and foreseeability of injury to others 
resulting from the unguarded stairway; or, alternatively, 
that she was a business invitee upon the premises of 
Gladys' Beauty Salon and, therefore, that she was owed 
that same duty of care under the circumstances. 
Mrs. Black's status as a business invitee, who was 
using this entrance in the same manner that other patrons 
had used it, has a significant impact upon the question 
of contributory negligence. 
"A pedestrian's status with respect to the 
premises in question bears directly on the ques-
tion of his contributory negligence because it 
determines what he has a right to expect if he 
proceeds in darkness. A licensee takes the 
premises as he finds them, but under many cir-
cumstances an invitee has a right to assume that 
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they are safe for his use . . ." (Emphasis add-
ed) 22 A.L.R.3d 294. 
Plaintiff argues that Lulu Black was in a place where 
the public was invited. She had a right to expect safe 
passageway and she had, in fact, left Gladys' Beauty Salon 
through the rear entrance on a prior occasion. It was 
simply not reasonable to expect a business invitee to en-
counter darkness and a potentially hazardous unguarded 
stairway in this rear entrance which was used by numer-
ous other patrons. As a business invitee she has the right 
to expect a safe entrance and not one that is inherently 
dangerous. Plaintiff submits that on this basis she is 
not contributory negligent as a matter of law. 
In Markley v. Wiseman, 491 P. 2d 79 (Col. App. 
1971), the court stated that the distinction between a 
licensee and an invitee is not controlling, but is only one 
element among many to be considered in determining the 
land owner's liability for personal injury to an entrant 
upon his land. In this particular case the plaintiff was 
an insurance salesman who obtained defendants' names 
as prospective customers and made an appointment to 
meet with them at their home to discuss insurance cover-
age. He had never been to the defendants' home prior 
to the evening of the appointment. Plaintiff arrived at 
the defendants' residence while it was still daylight and 
spent approximately two hours in their home. As he left 
the home plaintiff walked down the sidewalk toward a 
gate located approximately 30 feet from the front door. 
By this time it was dark. Plaintiff was able to see the 
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gate, but could see no further. The only illumination in 
the immediate vicinity was a 75 watt lamp over the front 
door of the residence. He proceeded past the front gate 
but failed to observe eight steep concrete steps descend-
ing from the gate to the street level. He had walked up 
these same steps some two hours earlier. Plaintiff fell 
and thereby suffered serious injuries. Upon a trial to the 
court judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. 
Defendants' appealed to the Colorado Appellate Court 
stating that plaintiff should have been ruled contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. The Appellate Court 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 
It is submitted that the plaintiff, Lulu Black, stands 
in a better position than the plaintiff in Markley. Mrs. 
Black was totally unaware of the existence of the stair-
way while the plaintiff in Markley had traversed the 
same steps only two hours earlier. Mrs. Black had seen 
people enter and leave through the rear entrance of 
Gladys' and had left through the rear entrance on a prior 
occasion hersdf. She had no reason to suspect that there 
was an unguarded stairway dangerously near the rear 
entrance to the beauty salon. 
P O I N T I I I 
D A R K N E S S I S A R E L A T I V E T E R M 
A N D T H E E X A C T N A T U R E O F T H E 
D A R K N E S S IS AN I M P O R T A N T 
C O N S I D E R A T I O N I N D E T E R M I N -
I N G I F O N E IS C O N T R I B U T O R I L Y 
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N E G L I G E N T AS A M A T T E R O F 
L A W . 
The factor of the degree of darkness in determining 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is discussed at 
28A.L.R. 3d 625: 
"The degree of darkness has a direct bearing 
on the question of the plaintiff's contributory 
negligence. The contributory negligence de-
fense is stronger if the plaintiff walked in 
total darkness than it is where the darkness was 
not absolute." 
Darkness is a relative term. Even the use by Lulu 
Black of the term "pitch black" (Tr. p. 308) may leave 
room for an interpretation that includes the presence 
of some light appearing under the door. Plaintiff respect-
fully requests the court to refer to the earlier cited testi-
mony on pages 249, 352, and 365 of the Transcript. The 
record clearly discloses that even with the electric light 
off in the landing area and the rear entrance door closed, 
that light was visible from under the rear door leading 
to the interior of Gladys' Beauty Salon. 
It is also submitted that the degree of darkness is 
important. When Mrs. Black opened the door to the 
room, light shined into the landing area. She was able 
to see the landing area between the outside door and the 
interior door leading into the beauty shop. The annota-
tion in 22 A. L. R. 3d 305 summarizes the court's handling 
of the question of contributory negligence when one is 
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suddenly plunged into a degree of darkness as happened 
to Lulu Black. 
"The courts have also noted, in holding not 
contributory negligent one who proceeded in 
a dark hall, that the hall was lighted until 
plunged into darkness by the breaking of a cir-
cuit, or appeared lighted until a door closed 
shutting off the light from a room. 
The degree of darkness is also important, espe-
cially in Pennsylvania. In some cases the area 
in which the pedestrian walked has been held 
to have been not so dark as to require him to 
wait for light or assistance. In other cases the 
courts have noted, in holding a pedestrian not 
to have been contributorily negligent, that he 
did not proceed in total darkness: . . . " (Em-
phasis added) 
Plaintiff submits that the record clearly discloses that 
there was light under the rear door leading to the interior 
of the beauty salon towards which Lulu Black was at-
tempting to walk. The plaintiff, in attempting to walk 
towards the source of light, is not conclusively negligent, 
but rather it is a question of fact upon which reasonable 
minds can well differ. 
In Mozert v. Noeding, 76 N. M. 396, 415 P. 2d 364 
(1966), the plaintiff sustained personal injuries when she 
fell down an unguarded stairway in a dimly lit storeroom 
of an artist's gallery when she came to the gallery to pick 
up a peg board promised to her by the artist. The trial 
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court rendered judgment in favor of the artist upon a 
directed verdict on the question of contributory negli-
gence at the close of plaintiff's case in chief and plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court held that the question of 
the visitor's contributory negligence was for the jury. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court stated: 
" . . . In considering the motion for a directed 
verdict at the close of her case, plaintiff was 
entitled to have the evidence, together with all 
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, 
viewed in the light most favorable to her." 
(Supra, 365.) 
The court also held that in this case there was evi-
dence from which it could be found or reasonably in-
ferred that the plaintiff's actions were reasonable under 
the circumstances and that the question of contributory 
negligence was one for the jury. 
The Mozert case bears some striking resemblances 
to the case at bar. In both cases the plaintiff entered the 
premises of the defendant either at the express or im-
plied invitation of the defendant. Both landing areas were 
small and dimly lit. There was evidence that both plain-
tiffs were moving cautiously as their senses of sight and 
feeling directed them. Neither plaintiff had any warning 
of the danger of the unguarded stairway. In Mrs. Black's 
case the stairway was dangerously close to the interior 
doorway into the beauty salon. Plaintiff submits that the 
well reasoned opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court 
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in Mozert v. Noeding should be applied to the facts in the 
instant case. 
P O I N T IV 
P L A I N T I F F I S NOT CONTRIBUTOR-
I L Y N E G L I G E N T AS A M A T T E R O F 
L A W B E C A U S E S H E E X E R C I S E D 
O R D I N A R Y CARE I N E N T E R I N G 
T H E R E A R DOOR O F T H E B E A U T Y 
SALON. 
Plaintiff submits that the question of whether Lulu 
Black exercised reasonable care under the circumstances 
is one for the trier of fact. As a business invitee or even 
as a licensee under the well reasoned recent cases cited 
previously, plaintiff is required to exercise the ordinary 
care of the mythical reasonable man. Her conduct is re-
quired to be that of a prudent business invitee consider-
ing all of the surrounding circumstances. 
Let us consider for a moment the manner in which 
the plaintiff proceeded. She did not proceed heedlessly 
and recklessly into an unknown and darkened area, but 
on the contrary, entered the landing area at the rear of 
Gladys' Beauty Salon prudently, carefully and circum-
spectfully as she had observed many other patrons doing. 
Hers was certainly not an act of recklessness. Here 
is how Lulu Black, herself, describes the manner in which 
she proceeded: 
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"Well, by this time I was quite positive that I 
was just as close to one door as I was to the 
other, because when I opened the door I could 
see the passageway to the beauty shop door, 
and I thought I was going in that direction in 
the dark. 
And rather than turn around I just didn't 
think to turn around and go back to the door 
that had closed on me. I didn't know where it 
was as much as I knew where the lighted door 
was and I was going in that direction." (Tr. p. 
249) 
This is not the description of one who is jumping 
headlong into the dark unknown, but rather it is the de-
scription of a cautious prudent person proceeding to a 
known destination that was lighted. Lulu Black testified 
that she could see the lighted door. She proceeded toward 
it cautiously. It was probably only three or four steps 
away from her at the most (Tr. p. 250). Plaintiff would 
argue that this cannot be contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. It is the type of action that reasonable 
men such as Judges Harding and Ballif can well differ 
upon as to whether it constitutes contributory negligence. 
Plaintiff submits that the following facts should also 
be considered. The distance walked by Lulu Black after 
she opened the door was very short, possibly less than 
three or four steps (Tr. p. 254, line 7). The time interval 
was a very short duration. Mrs. Black was thrust into 
semi-darkness in not totally unfamiliar surroundings, but 
she proceeded cautiously as a reasonable business invitee 
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would. Plaintiff had no knowledge nor did she suspect 
that there was an unguarded stairway only a few short 
inches from the rear interior door into Gladys' Beauty 
Salon. Plaintiff contends that under the circumstances, 
when one considers all of the factors in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, that whether Lulu Black was 
negligent is certainly a question upon which reasonable 
minds could well differ. In Newman v. Pace, 196 Kansas 
689, 413 P. 2d 1013 (1966), the Kansas Supreme Court 
stated: 
" In ascertaining whether, as a matter of law, a 
plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence 
precluding recovery, the court must accept as 
true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff along 
with the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, disregarding testimony which is un-
favorable to the plaintiff. The court may not 
weigh any part of the evidence which is contra-
dictory nor any contradicton between plain-
tiffs direct and cross-examination. The plain-
tiffs evidence must be considered liberally in 
his favor and doubts resolved against defend-
ant, and if the facts be such that reasonable 
minds might arrive at contrary conclusions, the 
matter of contributory negligence must go to 
the jury." (Emphasis added) 
CONCLUSION 
Lulu Black did exercise reasonable care. She looked 
towards the door to which she was walking. She did not 
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notice nor had she any reason to suspect the presence of 
an unguarded stairway. After the open door had closed 
she thought she had only one or two more steps to take. 
When the door closed Lulu Black was already in the cen-
ter of the landing area. She thought she was much closer 
to the inside entrance into the beauty salon than she was 
to the outside door which had just closed behind her. She 
could see the light underneath this interior doorway. 
Plaintiff argues that however one characterizes this man-
ner of proceeding, it certainly doesn't resemble that of 
one groping helplessly in the dark. It is the action of one 
to which reasonable men could well differ as to whether 
these actions were so reckless as to be negligent as a 
matter of law. A mere recital of the manner of her pro-
ceeding clearly demonstrates that whether her acts con-
stituted negligence is a question upon which all reason-
able minds can well differ and this is all that plaintiff 
must demonstrate. In this case the question of contribu-
tory negligence should be remanded for consideration by 
the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff,Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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